Tuesday, November 30, 2010

"my burden is light"







Not Yet December 7
(Vers 7 Décembre)



In war, the rule of an eye for an eye should be adopted.

A weapon should target a weapon an enemy has but not an enemy himself.

To destroy all the weapons the enemy has is the principal aim of a war.

To kill any soldier of the enemy is not the principal aim of a war.

To destroy all the dangerous offensive weapons China has before they are used, how many missiles do Japan and the U.S. need?

Maybe, less than one million.



SECTION I: Japanese Two Parties: LDP vs. DPJ

LDP is a conservative and genuinely pro-American party with members who respect traditional Japanese value, though it lost power in the 30-8-2009 election.

DPJ is a socialistic and pro-Chinese/Korean party with members who do not respect traditional Japanese value, since it took over power for the first time in the 30-8-2009 election.

In 2005, the Koizumi boom brought a big victory to the LDP. The following is a pattern for political division in widely assumed prosperity.
[25,887,798 vs. 21,036,425]

In the 30-8-2009 election, a regime change through election occurred in Japan for the first time after WWII. The following is a pattern for a state of a quasi-revolutionary change in a democratic and free society.
[18,810,217 vs. 29,844,799]

In November 2010 election for the Okinawa Governor, LDP virtually got majority support. The following is a pattern for a state of a quasi-power struggle between pro-establishment and anti-establishment.
[335,708 vs. 297,082]

However, supporters for the DPJ include those who pursue justice and equity more than mere rule by the DPJ.

Likewise, supporters for the LDP include those who pursue freedom or patriotism more than mere rule by the LDP.

The key to the 2010 regime change is 50-years long failed pension management for which the LDP is mostly responsible, since half-hearted record keeping by public officials caused a complete or partial loss of pension to tens of millions of Japanese citizens. This shocking scandal was mostly revealed by a DPJ lawmaker in 2006. It made the fall of the LDP regime inevitable before the 2009 general election.

The current status looks like being symbolized in the result of the very recent Okinawa gubernatorial election.

From a view of political science, these three graphical patterns show a typical swinging situation in a two-party system.

However, with a big victory in 2005, the LDP wondered if they could satisfy 55% of voters in their subsequent administration of Japan. It tells that LDP politicians know their ability, and thus they are a kind of professionals.

Yet, with a drastic victory in 2009, the DPJ did not wonder if they could satisfy 60% of voters in their subsequent administration of Japan. It tells that DPJ politicians do not even know their ability, thus they are a kind of amateurs.

In 2009, Japanese voters thought that unfaithful professionals are worse than honest amateurs. But now, Japanese voters have found that they have mistaken foolish amateurs as honest amateurs.

So, in the next general election, if LDP candidates look faithful professionals, they will take over power. If DPJ candidates look wise amateurs, they might still keep power.

Nonetheless, voters decision in future national/local elections in Japan can be made at a deeper level: whether candidates respect Japanese traditional value or not as observed in Okinawa (though it looks like on Okinawa traditional value).

Note that as Japanese critics, journalists, and professors are all rich, they cannot understand graveness of the pension scandal, so that they have always made ambiguous or irrelevant explanations on the Japanese politics. You must refer to EEE-Reporter to know the Japanese politics correctly, since only I have pointed to the pension scandal as the major factor for the 2009 regime change in Japan.

For your reference, the division of votes in the 2010 U.S. midterm election is as follows:

[37,057,491 vs. 33,883,538]




SECTION II: How the Pear Harbor Day was Decided

The assault landing on Kota Bharu, a city facing the South China Sea in the Malay Peninsula, was started around 01:30 a.m. of December 8, 1941, Japan Time, with many landing boats dashing to the shore over 7 feet-high waves.

Accordingly 5,300 soldiers of the Imperial Army of Japan began to engage in battle with 6,000 British/Indian troops along the shoreline of Kota Bharu. Eventually, defeating enemies and marching 1,100 km in 55 days, 35,000 troops of the Imperial Army reached the Johor Bahru facing Singapore over a strait.

This was the start of the Pacific Theater of WWII.

The air raid on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was started at 03:19 a.m. of December 8, 1941, Japan Time, or 07:49 a.m. of December 7, 1941, Hawaii Time as an Imperial command plane issued an attack sign flying over the Harbor to other planes following it.

Accordingly 183 Imperial Navy fighter planes and bombers, as the first wave, began to attack US Navy ships, followed by the second wave of 171 Imperial Navy planes. They all took off from six aircraft carriers of the Imperial Navy situated 350 km (220 miles) north of Hawaii.

This was the start of the Japan-U.S. War.

But, why was it launched on December 8, Japan Time?

It was climate condition of the Malay Peninsula.

Since the autumn of 1940, meteorologic observatories in Bangkok and Singapore had stopped providing meteorological data for the Empire of Japan. So, a Japanese military officer was secretly sent to Bangkok to obtain data in February, 1941. Taking several months, he finally bribed a Thai official and took pictures of data sheets with cameras in September. The officer then returned to the staff headquarters in Tokyo, where a professor of meteorology was invited to check and analyze the data.

"Which is better for landing on the Malay Peninsula, in the first half or the second half of early December, sir?" asked officers in the the staff headquarters of the Imperial Army.

"Statistically, the landing on the Peninsula will be possible on December 8," answered the professor.

"Which is better for landing, in the morning or the afternoon, sir?" asked officers in the the staff headquarters of the Imperial Army.

"How can I know? No, I don't know," replied the professor, somewhat offended.

In this way, the Army of the Empire of Japan decided to launch the assault landing operation on the Malay Peninsula on December 8, 1941, Japan Time.

Naturally, the Navy of the Empire of Japan decided to launch an air raid onto Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 8, 1941, Japan Time, namely on December 7, American Time.

(http://bookweb.kinokuniya.co.jp/htm/9784404037831.html )


Though the Empire of Japan had no intention to declare war against the U.K. and the Netherlands, the start of the operation in the Malay Peninsula was one hour and 49 minutes earlier than the first steep dive by a Japanese plane in Pearl Harbor which had been planned not to precede declaration of war against the U.S.

Within 30 minutes of the assault landing on Kota Bharu by the Imperial Army, I suppose, the British military headquarters in Singapore must have been informed of the long-waited start of war. Then, within 30 minutes, emergency communications must have been exchanged between Singapore and Hawaii, London, or Washington D.C. If so, the U.S. Government must have been aware of the start of the war in the Pacific Ocean 49 minutes before the first Japanese bomb was dropped on a U.S. Naval ship in Pearl Harbor in the early morning of December 7, 1941.


(According to a theory, the British military did not know that the Empire of Japan had the notable Zero fighters...
When it was introduced early in World War II, the Zero was the best carrier-based fighter in the world, combining excellent maneuverability and very long range.[1] In early combat operations, the Zero gained a legendary reputation as a "dogfighter", achieving the outstanding kill ratio of 12 to 1...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A6M_Zero )


*** *** *** ***


Before the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. military succeeded in decoding coded telegrams and ciphers the Imperial Government and military were using and transmitting all over the world.

It is because an American intelligence agency stole a part of the code book called "Purple" from the Consulate-General of the Empire of Japan in New York in February 1939.

However, not only Imperial diplomats but also Imperial generals did not dream of their secret communications being intercepted and interpreted by American agents till the end of the Japan-U.S. War.

The lesson is that it is stupid to trust cryptograms in war.

The Imperual Navy should have announced openly to the American Navy the departure of its fleet from Japan to Hawaii, so that the Imperial and American fleets could meet each other in the middle of the Pacific Ocean between Tokyo and Honolulu, since the Empire had so many Zeros.

Yet, there is still a big mystery. At the time, nobody in the Empire of Japan and the United States doubted about the fate of making war against each other. But, why?






(http://www.fukuchan.ac/music/popular/redsails.html )








Mat 11:30 For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.